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Foreseeability in American and English Law
Harry G. Fuerst*
M ANY OF THE INEQUITIES of the common law have been
remedied in recent years. The workmen's compensation
acts have eliminated contributory negligence, assumption of risk
and fellow servant rule as employers' defenses. Congress has en-
acted laws to modify the common law for employees engaged in
interstate commerce: the Federal Employers' Liability Act,' the
Federal Safety Appliance Acts, 2 the Federal Boiler Inspection
Acts,3 the Jones Act,4 and so forth.
The adoption of the comparative negligence doctrine, for
example, in Wisconsin, the compulsory submission of the ques-
tion of contributory negligence to a jury in the State of New
Jersey, and the widespread liberalization of the rules of com-
mon law pleading have introduced flexibility into our present-
day adjudication of causes. But the problem of foreseeability is
not yet settled in our law.
The common law, despite its pitfalls with regard to sound
democratic principles in jurisprudence, is better than most
other systems: Idem est, fortior et potentior est dispositio legis
quam hominis-The disposition of the law is of greater force and
effect than that of man.5
Foreseeability is "the ability to see or know in advance,
hence, the reasonable anticipation that harm or injury is the
likely result of acts or omissions." 6
In order to determine culpable negligence and establish the
right to recover for a wrong, there must be a sequence of events
like concatenation, or a series of united events like the links of a
chain, called proximate cause. The definition of proximate cause
is, "that cause which in natural and continuous sequence, un-
*Of Miami Beach, Florida; member of the Bar of Illinois and Ohio.
1 45 U.S.C. Secs. 51-60 (1958).
2 Ibid. Secs. 1-16 (1958).
3 Id. Secs. 22-34 (1958).
4 Id. Sec. 688 (1958).
5 37 C.J.S. 131, n. 70.
6 Black, Law Dictionary, 777 (4th Ed. 1951).
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broken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred." 7
English Cases on Foreseeability
In 1961 the Privy Council of England passed on a cause
known as The Wagon Mounds and reversed the judgment of the
Supreme Court of New South Wales, Australia, thereby devising
a new formula in the never ending analysis of what constitutes
tort liability. The Wagon Mound destroyed a rule of law of
long standing, on foreseeability, decided and set forth in the
Polemis case.9
In Polemis the defendant chartered a boat which belonged
to the plaintiffs. When the boat arrived at port it became neces-
sary to shift a part of the petrol cargo, due to some leakage
caused by rough water. The defendant hired employees to
change the position of the petrol. The defendant's employees in
charge of this work placed certain pieces of lumber in position
to facilitate the lifting of the cases of petrol with a winch. The
defendant's employees also controlled the operation of the
winch. Due to the negligence of these employees a piece of
lumber became dislodged and fell into the hold with such force
as to cause a spark which ignited the petrol vapor. Fire im-
mediately broke out in the hold, totally destroying the ship.
The defendant contended that because of the nature and
character of the work in which their employees were engaged,
they could not be held liable, on the ground of foreseeability.
This was denied by the court and judgment was rendered in
favor of Polemis.
On appeal to the House of Lords, it was found that the de-
fendant charterer was liable because some damage to the ship
might reasonably have been anticipated from the negligence of
its employees. From this finding they held that the defendant
was responsible for all consequences of its negligent act, saying:
In the present case it was negligent in discharging cargo to
knock down the planks of the temporary staging, for they
might easily cause some damage either to workmen, or
cargo, or the ship. The fact that they did directly produce
7 Pope v. Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co., 120 So. 2d 227, 229 (Fla. 1960).
8 Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock and Eng'r. Co. (1961) A.C.
388 (P.C.) (Austl.).
9 In re Polemis and Furness Withy & Co. (1921) 3 K.B. 560 (C.A.).
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an unexpected result, a spark in an atmosphere of petrol
vapor which caused a fire, does not relieve the person who
was negligent from the damage which his negligent act
directly caused. 10
The word italicized is denounced in The Wagon Mound decision
hereinafter discussed.
The facts in The Wagon Mound disclose that fuel oil was
being taken aboard a ship named The Wagon Mound. Through
negligence, a lot of oil was spilled into the bay. Because of the
tide and wind the oil was carried toward respondent's dock and
under the dock and ways, surrounding their property. Re-
spondent or plaintiff was in the ship repair and marine engineer-
ing business, and at the time they were repairing and outfitting
a ship and had valuable supplies, machinery and tools on their
dock property.
Neither litigant feared that the oil spilled in the bay could
cause a conflagration. The condition remained in status quo for
two and a half days. Then it appeared, according to testimony,
that a piece of waste was ignited and dropped into the water
(by whom no one knows) which caused the oil to catch on
fire and resulted in a total loss of plaintiff's dock, ship, ma-
chinery and tools. The Supreme Court of New South Wales,
Australia, affirmed the judgment in favor of the plaintiff, rely-
ing on the law and precedent of the Polemis case that the de-
fendants were responsible for all consequences of their act, how-
ever grave, holding that the fire was the direct result of the
negligent act whether reasonably foreseeable or not.
It therefore becomes necessary to examine the decision in
the Wagon Mound case with reference to the Polemis case. Here
Polemis says that the defendant was responsible for all the conse-
quences of his negligent act and therefore held them in that case
to have been the direct result of the act whether reasonably
foreseeable or not.
Wagon Mound held:
The essential factor in determining liability for the con-
sequences of a tortious act of negligence is whether the dam-
age is of such a kind as the reasonable man should have
foreseen. Liability does not depend solely on the damage
being the "direct" or "natural" consequence of the precedent
act; but if a man should not be held liable for damage un-
10 Ibid.
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predictable by a reasonable man because it was "direct" or
"natural," equally he should not escape liability however
"indirect" the damage, if he foresaw or could reasonably
have foreseen the intervening events which led to its being
done. Foreseeability is thus the effective test-the "direct"
consequence test leads to nowhere but the never-ending and
insoluble problems of causation.
There is not one criterion for determining culpability
(or liability) and another for determining compensation;
unforeseeability of damage is relevant to liability or com-
pensation-there can be no liability until the damage has
been done; it is not the act but the consequences on which
tortious liability is founded."
The court determined that a man must be held responsible
only for the foreseeable probable consequences of his act. To
demand more of him would be unwarranted, to demand less
would ignore the necessity for a minimum standard of behavior.
The reason given for the reversal of the law pronounced
in the Polemis case was that the court was in error when it said
that the defendant was responsible for all consequences of its
negligent act; that the court erred when it said that defendant
was liable for any and all damage which its negligent act di-
rectly caused, instead of using the words "proximately caused."
It is not understood why the court in its decision was so
technical because the context in the opinion by the House of
Lords in the Polemis case clearly indicated their intention in the
use of the word "direct" was in truth and in fact to be fully
construed as the proximate cause.
Yet, the facts in the Polemis case clearly establish the culp-
ability of the defendant when considered under the doctrine
known to both American and British jurisprudence as res ipsa
loquitur. In Polemis the ship and its employees were under the
exclusive control of the defendant and the negligent handling
of the plank was done by the defendant's employees. The spark
created by negligence caused the fire and the resultant burning
of the ship which clearly established the right of recovery under
the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
But Polemis did not employ the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.
Furthermore, in Wagon Mound there is an intervening cause
directly responsible for the fire: The actions of an unknown per-
son who provided and dropped the burning waste. Wagon Mound
11 Supra n. 8 at 397.
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is pregnant with contributory negligence and possibly with sole
negligence of another as to the cause of the fire. In our judg-
ment the Privy Council reversed a non-liability case to revoke
a good pronouncement of law theretofore established in the
Polemis case.
The United States Supreme Court, in San Juan Light &
Transit Co. v. Requena12 defines res ipsa loquitur, and says:
Where a thing which causes injury, without fault of the
injured person is shown to be under the exclusive control
of the defendant, and the injury is such, as in the ordinary
course of things, does not occur if the one having such con-
trol uses proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the
absence of an explanation, that the injury arose from the
defendant's want of care.
The proved fact of electric shock, found in the above case, is
peculiarly analogous to the facts of Polemis. Similar applica-
tions arise in railroad cases with unexplained derailments and
many other types of accidents. 13
According to the British decision announced in Scott v.
London & St. Katherine Docks Co., 14 the same doctrine of res
ipsa loquitur is approved and in full force and effect in the
British Commonwealth:
There must be reasonable evidence of negligence; but
where the thing is shown to be under the management of
the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in
the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who
have the management use proper care, it affords reason-
able evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defend-
ant that the accident arose from want of care.
By the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, the
plaintiff in the Polemis case was entitled to full recovery whether
the case had been tried under British or American jurisprudence.
American Cases on Foreseeability
It was of great interest to the American Bar when Wagon
Mound was reversed and the decisional law of the Polemis case
12 224 U.S. 89, 32 Sup. Ct. 399, 56 L. Ed. 680 (1911).
13 Jesionowski v. Boston & M. R.R., 329 U.S. 452, 67 Sup. Ct. 401, 91 L. Ed.
416 (1947); Central Ry. of NJ. v. Peluso, 286 F. 661 (CCA2 1923); Minne-
apolis & St. Louis Ry. v. Gotschall, 244 U.S. 66, 37 Sup. Ct. 598, 61 L. Ed. 995
(1916), and Cochran v. Railway, 31 F. 2d 769 (N.D. Ohio 1923).
14 (1865) 3 H. & C. 596.
Sept., 1965
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was denounced and referred to as bad law by their lordships in
the Privy Council. It was pointed out to their lordships, re-
ferring to the Smith case 15 (the authority upon which the
Polemis case was decided), that "Smith's case does not cor-
respond with the position in the law of the United States of
America as held and enunciated in Palsgraf v. Long Island Rail-
way Co." 16
In effect, it was felt that the New York Court of Appeals,
through Cardozo, J., used the same philosophy to eliminate the
Polemis pronouncement of law in the Palsgraf case, also known
as the firecracker case. In Palsgraf plaintiff, while in defendant's
station, was struck by weighing scales dislodged by the ex-
plosion of a package of firecrackers dropped by a passenger
being assisted onto a moving train by defendant's negligent
guard. Said the court:
The conduct of the defendant's guard, if a wrong in its
relation to the holder of the package, was not a wrong in its
relation to the plaintiff, standing far away. Relatively to her
it was not negligence at all. Nothing in the situation gave
notice that the falling package had in it the potency of peril
to persons thus removed. Negligence is not actionable un-
less it involves the invasion of a legally protected interest,
the violation of a right. "Proof of negligence in the air, so
to speak, will not do." * * * "Negligence is the absence of
care, according to the circumstances." * * * 17
The overruling of Polemis by the House of Lords in Wagon
Mound has left as an enigma, that which was formerly regarded
in the British Commonwealth as settled law.
Professor Leon Green, in an article, i8 makes this observa-
tion:
A reading of The Wagon Mound decision, however, seems
to indicate that the Privy Council had much more in mind
than either correcting the error of the courts below or elimi-
nating the doctrinal structure of Polemis. The foreseeability
formula of The Wagon Mound is much more comprehensive
than any heretofore suggested. It rolls into a single formula
much that is relevant to the issues of duty, negligence, and
damages. This is undoubtedly a strong temptation when a
15 Smith v. London & South Western Ry. Co. (1870) L.R. 6 C-P. 14.
16 248 N.Y. 339, 225 N.Y. Supp. 412, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
17 Ibid.
18 Green, Foreseeability in Negligence Law, 61 Columbia L. Rev. 1401, 1415
(1961).
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judge exercises the functions ordinarily allocated to a jury,
but it is dangerous to yield to the temptation. The seem-
ing simplicity of the "all purpose" formula could prove a
snare resulting in great injustice and endless confusion in
cases to come.
The Florida Supreme Court followed the reasoning of the
Palsgraf case on the foreseeability doctrine in affirming the de-
cision in Pope v. Pinkerton-Hays Lumber Co.19 In this case a
telephone cable had been cut by defendant's construction crew,
thereby disconnecting plaintiff's telephone service. A fire oc-
curred on plaintiff's premises, resulting in substantial destruc-
tion because it was impossible to summon the aid of the fire
department by telephone.
The court, in ruling on these facts, using the doctrine of
foreseeability and granting that the defendant was negligent,
held that there can be no recovery for an injury that was not
a reasonable and foreseeable consequence of his negligent con-
duct, thereby denying liability.
It is worthy of note that the Florida court applied the fore-
seeability test to the independent intervening cause and con-
cluded that in some cases the intervening cause does not break
the causal connection if the intervention of such force is of itself
probable or foreseeable. This is the distinction that the Florida
Supreme Court made in reversing in part the previous decision
of the appellate court. The holding here is comparable and can
be likened to the underlying philosophy announced in the
Palsgraf case by Cardozo.
Similarly, in Ohio Jurisprudence it is stated:
The act of a third person, which intervenes and con-
tributes a condition necessary to the injurious effect of the
original negligence, will not excuse the first wrongdoer, if
such act ought to have been foreseen. 20
Regarding the right to determine all questions arising under
the common law and the jurisdiction towards determining such
rights, the Supreme Court of the United States, in Erie R. R. v.
Tompkins,21 by reversing the old Tyson 22 case finally settled
19 127 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 1961).
20 39 Ohio Jur. 2d, Negligence, 545.
21 304 U.S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188 (1938).
22 Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
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that every state in the Union is vested with the power to de-
termine the common law and that federal courts do not have any
such common law powers. Every individual state has the ex-
clusive right to determine its common law rights, including rules
of permissible evidence thereunder. All federal courts, in-
cluding the United States Supreme Court, must follow the law
as interpreted and pronounced by the highest tribunal of the
state where the cause was initiated and tried.23
The progress of the American courts in negligence, proxi-
mate cause, and foreseeability has come about because we have
fifty state supreme courts and thousands of intermediary courts.
By contrast, jury cases in the British Commonwealth are a rarity.
The English judges are also the judges of the facts.
The issue of causal relation between defendant's conduct
and the plaintiff's injury is not primarily determined by foresee-
ability. It can only be determined after the event and, while
usually not difficult, in some cases may be so very difficult as to
require expert opinions from physicians, attorneys, engineers,
industrial and special types of technicians and certain craftsmen.
Quoting from The Wagon Mound:
After the event even a fool is wise. But it is not the
hindsight of a fool, it is the foresight of the reasonable man
which alone can determine responsibility.2 4
If there is any evidence raising the issue of foreseeability,
its determination and finding is for the jury in the United States.
An example is the case of Gedeon v. East Ohio Gas Co.25 where
plaintiff, driver of a truck, was struck by an oncoming car
swerving to avoid defendant pedestrian, employee of the gas
company, who carelessly stepped into traffic.
The court stated:
* * * it is, in our opinion, impossible to say as a matter of
law, that Tesnow (defendant pedestrian) was free from neg-
ligence. Common experience attests the danger of stepping
from the left side of a parked car directly into a heavily
23 See 28 U.S.C.A. 725, "In federal courts, except in matters governed by
Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, law to be applied in any case
is law of state * * * HELD to include not only state statutory law, but also
state decisions on questions of general law * *
24 Supra n. 8 at 424.
25 128 Ohio St. 335, 190 N.E. 924 (1934).
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traveled street. Common experience likewise gives daily
warning of the danger of crossing such a street in traffic
without looking for the approach of vehicles. It is for the
jury to say whether any reasonably careful and prudent per-
son might be expected to know that his sudden and unex-
pected appearance in such a street in front of an oncoming
car would probably cause its driver to take emergency ac-
tion to avoid striking him, emergency action which might
consist in swerving into another lane of traffic with a sub-
sequent collision.
2 6
Foreseeability contemplates a legal duty, but there is no
fixed standard of conduct in law. Custom and usage are no de-
fense for unreasonable and dangerous conduct, nor for careless-
ness.
One of the most important decisions on foreseeability ap-
plied and rendered by the Ohio Supreme Court is the case of
LoSchiavo v. Northern Ohio Traction & Light Co.27 This was a
case where a street car collided with a truck. The plaintiff
claimed damages for the loss of his business due to his injuries,
resulting from the collision.
The court held that the plaintiff should not be permitted to
recover for the loss of his business. The plaintiff could, however,
testify as to the value of the service that he, himself, rendered
to the business and the amount the plaintiff would have to pay
another to take his place in the operation of the business. Mar-
shall, C.J. stated that an inquiry into the realm of profits of a
business opens a wide field for speculation and fraudulent prac-
tices, and in any well-contested controversy justice could only
be arrived at by a thorough inquiry into the business and ac-
counting. Not only are such facts peculiarly within the knowl-
edge of the injured party but it would be possible for him to
make a false showing which would be beyond contradiction by
the evidence available to the defense. Therefore,
In such action it is proper to admit evidence of a party's
business, its character, its extent, the part transacted by him
and the compensation paid to persons doing such business
for another, but it is error to admit evidence of net profits
of such business.28
26 Id. at 926.
27 106 Ohio St. 61, 138 N.E. 372 (1922).
28 Ibid.
Sept., 1965
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Another very important case involving business profits is
Bishop v. East Ohio Gas Co.29 In this case the plaintiff chemist
kept certain glass flasks containing cultures of great value to him
for the preparation of a marketable product known as "Almalac,"
an intestinal drug, in his laboratory. The defendant through its
agent, a meter reader, forced in the door near which these flasks
were kept, breaking the flasks and destroying the cultures.
The underlying reasoning of law concerning the rights of
recovery against a person who commits the trespass of breaking
and entering a home or place of business is found under the es-
tablished law of Schell v. Dubois, 30 wherein the syllabus recites
that a violation of state law or municipal ordinance passed for
the protection or safety of the public is negligence per se.
The trespasser under the common law takes the property as
he finds it and must repay in full for all damage incurred by his
unlawful conduct. Therefore, when the cause of Bishop v. East
Ohio Gas Co.3 1 was decided, although it was contended by the
defendant that it was not liable (on the grounds of no foresee-
ability) for the loss of cultures and tubes caused by the forcible
entry of its agent into the plaintiff's property, the lower courts
held that the defendant was liable. The only question raised in
the Supreme Court of Ohio was the question of the value and
whether the plaintiff himself was qualified to testify as an expert
on the value of his cultures. The Supreme Court of Ohio affirmed
the judgment of the lower court, thereby certifying not only as
to the evidence of the value by the plaintiff but that he was en-
titled to full damages for his loss.
In a recent Supreme Court case, Gallick v. Baltimore & 0.
R.R.32 the doctrine of foreseeability was invoked in connection
with both the protection afforded under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act 3 3 and recovery under the negligence per se rule.
This action was initiated in the Court of Common Pleas of Ohio,
for an insect bite which resulted in a triple amputation of the
limbs of the plaintiff.
29 143 Ohio St. 541, 56 N.E. 2d 164 (1944).
30 94 Ohio St. 93, 113 N.E. 664 (1916).
31 Supra n. 29.
32 372 U.S. 108, 83 Sup. Ct. 659, 9 L. Ed. 618 (1963).
83 Supra n. 1.
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The appellate court in Ohio reversed the judgment and en-
tered a judgment non obstante veredicto. The Supreme Court of
Ohio refused the motion to certify and dismissed the appeal.
The Supreme Court of the United States granted a writ of cer-
tiorari. The Court found sufficient evidence for the cause to be
submitted to a jury. On the question whether the insect bite had
caused the injury, the insect having emanated from a stagnant
pool on railroad property adjacent to its track, the conclusion
of the United States Supreme Court says:
* * * Reasonable foreseeability is an essential ingredient of
Federal Employers' Liability Act negligence, * * * but this
requirement has been satisfied in the present case by the
jury's findings * * * of negligence in maintaining the filthy
pool of water.
8 4
It was on the question of foreseeability that the Ohio appel-
late court reversed the verdict for the plaintiff. Uniformly, the
courts have denied the defense of the doctrine of foreseeability
where a defendant is guilty of negligence per se. The Supreme
Court of the United States disposed of the contention of the Ohio
court with the following language:
* * * We have no doubt that under a statute where the tort-
feasor is liable for death or injuries caused even "in slightest
part" * * * by his negligence, such a tortfeasor must com-
pensate his victim for even the improbable or unexpectedly
severe consequences of his wrongful act.
5
Conclusion
If the House of Lords in the Poiemis case had applied the
doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in its decision, the Polemis case
would have remained the law on foreseeability of the British
Commonwealth.
The House of Lords in the Wagon Mound case forty years
later would never have disturbed the profoundness of the Pole-
mis decision.
34 Supra n. 32.
35 Ibid.
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